Zoning Ordinances that Exclude Mobile Homes from Districts Reserved for Single-Family Dwellings by Nelson, William Winslett
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 62 | Number 6 Article 29
8-1-1984
Zoning Ordinances that Exclude Mobile Homes
from Districts Reserved for Single-Family
Dwellings
William Winslett Nelson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William W. Nelson, Zoning Ordinances that Exclude Mobile Homes from Districts Reserved for Single-Family Dwellings, 62 N.C. L. Rev.
1374 (1984).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol62/iss6/29
Zoning Ordinances that Exclude Mobile Homes from Districts
Reserved for Single-Family Dwellings
Approximately one North Carolinian in ten lives in a mobile home.t The
demand for this form of housing has increased because of the steadily rising
costs of conventional housing, as well as improvements in the design and con-
struction of mobile homes.2 No longer viewed as an unfortunate necessity, the
mobile home has become a legitimate, even desirable, alternative to a tradi-
tional site-built home.3 As mobile homes begin to look more like conventional
housing, the mobile home owner begins to resemble the conventional home
owner. In age, occupation, number of children, and income, the demographic
characteristics of the mobile home owner approaches the average home
owner.
4
The law, however, has failed to keep pace with these developments. Al-
though the nation has experienced a serious low-cost housing shortage since
World War II, state and federal governments only recently have passed regu-
lations that enable mobile homes to help alleviate this problem.5 Local gov-
ernments, which could stimulate the use of the mobile home through their
zoning power, 6 have responded even more slowly. Although local resistance
to the mobile home may be eroding,7 many ordinances barring mobile homes
1. See Weber, Mobile homes gain ground, respect in NC. communities, The Raleigh News &
Observer, Jan. 8, 1984, at 30A, col. 2. Mobile homes are becoming known as "manufactured
housing." Id.
2. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES 7-8 (3d ed. 1974); Anderson,
The Regulation andAccommodation of Mobile Homes, 1975 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT
DOMAIN 151, 151.
3. Anderson, supra note 2, at 151.
4. See Acceptance Grows for Mobile Homes, 16 LAND USE DIG. Aug. 15, 1983.
5. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
6. Although regulation of the location of mobile homes is accomplished chiefly through
zoning, other means are available. The state directly controls the location of mobile homes
through floodplain control laws, see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.51 to -215.61 (1983), and coastal
area management acts, see id. §§ 113A-100 to -128. See Brough, State Laws and the Regulation of
Mobile Homes, POPULAR Gov'T, Summer 1975, at 12.
Municipal regulation of mobile home location may be accomplished not only through zoning
but also through the power to abate nuisances. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-193 (1982). The
North Carolina Supreme Court, however, has determined that mobile homes are not nuisances
per se and therefore may not be excluded from a municipality acting under its power to abate
nuisances. See Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879 (1970). Local boards of
health are the given authority under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-17(b) (1981) to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the protection of public health. This is a potential means of
regulating the location of mobile homes. See Brough, supra, at 13. Mobile homes also may be
restricted by private covenants. See Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55
CORNELL L. REv. 491, 514 (1970).
7. See Weber, supra note 1. See also 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZON-
ING AND PLANNING 19-4 to -5 (4th ed. 1983) (noting the increasing share of the low-cost housing
market captured by the mobile home industry); 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW
§§ 57.01, 57.42 n.280 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1983) (noting the increase in litigation involving mobile
homes). One writer has detected, perhaps over-optimistically, "a shifting of public attitudes from
psychological rejection of manufactured homes to increasingly unqualified acceptance." Dean,
What is a Mobile Home? The Law andManufactured Housing, CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct., 1981, at
10, 16.
from residential districts still exist in city and county codes,8 and likely will
remain there for the near future. This note discusses the development of mo-
bile home law, the types of zoning ordinances that exclude mobile homes from
residential districts, and two possible legal challenges to these ordinances.
The modem mobile home evolved from the travel trailers of the 1920s. 9
Travel trailers originally were designed to be pulled by cars and to serve as
temporary shelter for tourists and itinerant workers.' 0 Because these early
mobile homes were not suited for use as permanent housing,'" communities
objected to their location in conventional neighborhoods. Mobile homes also
were considered unsafe because they were not constructed in accordance with
state or local building codes and their low cost aroused suspicions of shoddy
design and workmanship. Some of the materials found in mobile homes were
highly flammable, and fires posed a danger not only to the occupants of the
mobile homes but to the lives and property of surrounding landowners. Early
mobile homes also were relatively lightweight and when not securely affixed to
the land could be overturned easily by high winds. They were also considered
dangerous to public health because they lacked the sanitary facilities of con-
ventional housing and were not subject to water and sewer regulation. 12
Furthermore, mobile homes were considered a burden to the community.
Their occupants had to be provided with all the municipal services afforded
other residents of the community, such as garbage collection and access to
public schools. 13 When a large number of mobile homes were situated in a
small area the high population density placed a considerable strain on munici-
pal resources. 14 Moreover, the low cost and rapid depreciation of mobile
homes deprived municipalities of tax revenues that might have offset the bur-
dens imposed.15 Mobile homes often were classified as personalty, and many
states taxed personalty at a lower rate than realty.' 6 Consequently, the public
accused mobile home owners of failing to pay their own way.
The public also objected to mobile homes on moral grounds. Mobile
home occupants were considered undesirable nomads with no stake in the
8. See, e.g., oidinance cited infra note 116.
9. See, e.g., 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 14.01 (2d ed. 1976); B. HODES &
G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 5.
10. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 14.01.
11. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
12. Early mobile homes were exempt from water and sewer regulation because municipali-
ties viewed them as vehicles rather than houses. See, e.g., Napierkowski v. Township Comm. of
Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959); Midgarden v. City of Grand Forks, 79 N.D. 18, 54
N.W.2d 659 (1952). See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 14.05; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7,
§ 57.09.
13. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 9, § 14.05; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.09.
14. See, e.g., RezIar v. Village of Riverside, 28 Ill. 2d 142, 190 N.E.2d 706 (1963); Town of
Yorkville v. Fonk, 3 Wis. 2d 371, 88 N.W.2d 319, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 58 (1958). See also 2 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 9, §§ 14.01, 14.05; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.15.
15. See, e.g., New York Mobile Home Ass'n v. Steckel, 9 N.Y.2d 533, 175 N.E.2d 151 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 150 (1962). See generally Kuklin, Housing and Technology: The Mobile
Home Experience, 44 TENN. L. REv. 765, 809-26 (1977).
16. Kuklin, supra note 15, at 812.
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community. 17 The close quarters of the mobile home were suspected of pro-
ducing an undesirable precocity in children, potentially causing moral harm.' 1
Finally, mobile homes were believed to lower the value of surrounding
property.' 9 Mobile homes were considered ugly, or at least sufficiently differ-
ent in appearance to disturb the architectural harmony of the neighborhood. 20
Furthermore, because mobile home occupants were considered undesirable,
the presence of mobile homes was thought to lower the "social tone" of the
neighborhood.21 In response to all these objections municipalities enacted
zoning ordinances restricting the location of mobile homes.22
Despite these zoning ordinances and objections to mobile homes, mobile
home ownership has increased dramatically since the 1920s.23 One reason for
this growth is the serious national shortage of low-cost housing,24 which has
been aggravated by increased unemployment. 25 Since the conventional hous-
ing industry cannot meet the increased need for low-cost housing, more people
have turned to the mobile home as their only form of affordable housing.26 In
the late 1960s the federal government recognized mobile homes as a means of
solving the housing problem. 27 State and local authorities gradually have fol-
lowed the lead of the federal government,28 and mobile homes have become
17. See In re Tradlock, 261 N.C. 120, 122, 134 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1964) (referring to the "unde-
sirable type of people who would live in the mobile homes"). See also Streyle v. Board of Prop-
erty Assessment, Appeals and Review, 173 Pa. Super. 324, 98 A.2d 410 (1953); Crane v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 175 Neb. 568, 122 N.W.2d 520 (1963). See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF,
supra note 7, at 19-4.
18. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-4.
19. See, e.g., Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Town of Manchester v.
Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962). See Kuklin, supra note 15, at 823.
20. See Kuklin, supra note 15, at 823. The aesthetic problem presented by mobile homes
often is compounded by a proliferation of outbuildings around the unit due to a lack of storage
space within. Insofar as zoning ordinances restricting the location of mobile homes are founded
on aesthetic considerations, it should be noted that a majority of American jurisdictions have
approved zoning on aesthetic grounds. See Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder." A New Ma-
jority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REv. 125 (1980). The North
Carolina Supreme Court approved aesthetic zoning in State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675
(1982). See Note, State v. Jones: Aesthetic Regulation-From Junkyards to Residences?, 61 N.C.L.
REv. 942 (1983).
21. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 473.
22. See infra notes 57-63, 116 and accompanying text.
23. See B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 6; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 448,
451; Smith, The Impact of Mobile Homes on the Housing Market, 41 POPULAR GOV'T 1, at 1
(1975).
24. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-4.
25. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-4.
26. See SHEPARD'S MOBILE HOMES AND MOBILE HOME PARKS, § 1.2 (L. Davis ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as SHEPARD'S]; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.01.
27. In 1968 Congress launched "Operation Breakthrough" in an attempt to help solve the
nation's housing problem. The Department of Housing and Urban Development was authorized
to subsidize or directly finance 4,000,000 new housing units, including mass-produced low-cost
units, over a 10-year period. See Flippen, Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances Wlch Exclude
Mobile Homes, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 15, 16-17, nn.16-17 (1974). In 1970 President Nixon, in a
message to Congress, declared that an increase in the supply of mobile homes was necessary for
the nation to reach its housing goals. M. DRURY, MOBILE HOMES 114 (2d ed. 1972). Later, Con-
gress passed the National Mobile Home Safety and Construction Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401
to 5426 (1976), recognizing mobile homes as a significant form of housing and regulating them.
28. Official recognition of the importance of the mobile home for North Carolina citizens
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more acceptable to the public.2 9
The transformation in design and construction of mobile homes also has
contributed to their increasing popularity. The sudden and large scale de-
mand for the mobile home as alternative permanent housing during and im-
mediately following World War II led to changes in design and construction.30
After the war the dimensions of the standard unit were increased steadily, first
in length and then in width.31 Greater and more versatile interior space was
introduced with the "double-wide," 32 the "expandable," 33 and multistory
units.34 Mobile homes could no longer be pulled behind cars but had to be
towed by large trucks or carried on flatbed trailers to their sites. 35 Today,
mobile homes usually are stripped of their wheels and tongues and placed on
permanent foundations.36
As the mobile home has approached the conventional home in size and
immobility, so also in appearance. Mobile homes now are equipped with all
the amenities of site-built housing, including all major appliances and com-
plete furnishings.37 Pitched and shingled roofing and masonite or wood siding
also are available.38
Thus, many of the objections that led to restrictions on the location of
mobile homes are no longer valid because of changes in design, construction,
and regulation. 39 One objection, however, remains both widespread and ar-
includes the following statements: (1) By the North Carolina General Assembly: "[M]obile
homes have become a primary housing resource for many citizens of North Carolina." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-143.8 (1983); (2) By the North Carolina Supreme Court: Mobile homes are "'a per-
fectly respectable, healthy and useful kind of housing, adopted by choice by several million people
in this country today.'" Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 443, 177 S.E.2d 879, 882 (1970)
(quoting Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1963)); (3) By the Multi-County Planning Commission, Region G: "One technique
for avoiding the high cost of housing is purchasing a mobile home. As the need for less expensive
housing increases, the importance of the mobile home in housing the people of our region will
emerge." B. CALLOWAY, L. Cox, W. COLONNA, C. Loop, M. BORUM & T. COOKE, REGIONAL
HOUSING PLAN: STATE MULTI-COUNTY PLANNING REGION G 63-64 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
B. CALLOWAY].
29. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 152. Other factors leading to the increased popularity of
the mobile home, include the adoption of industry-wide quality standards, see SHEPARD'S, sufpra
note 26, § 1.2, and the availability of more favorable financing to the mobile home purchaser. See
id.; M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 93-94. Also, the development of more and better mobile home
parks, see SHEPARD's, supra note 26, § 1.2, along with more creative land use planning, see Ander-
son, supra note 2, at 163, have helped foster public acceptance.
30. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 2.
31. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
32. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
33. An "expandable" is a unit with "one or more room sections that fold, collapse, or tele-
scope into the principal unit while transported on the highways and are firmly joined together
when stationed on the site, provid[ing] additional living-room area." B. HODES & G. ROBERSON,
supra note 2, at xxxvii.
34. M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 99.
35. M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 93-94.
36. 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.03.
37. SHEPARD'S, supra note 26, § 1.1.
38. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-5.
39. For the objections to mobile homes, see supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
One group of objections was based on a concern for the public safety. Mobile homes today
are built in accordance with federal safety and construction regulations, see supra note 27, which
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guably valid: that mobile homes reduce the value of surrounding property.40
Even today some mobile homes, in terms of roof pitch, exterior siding, or
other architectural details, differ from site-built homes. On the other hand, in
size, shape, and materials, many modem mobile homes are "scarcely distin-
guishable from site-built homes."'41 Thus, it is unrealistic to distinguish be-
tween mobile homes and site-built homes per se. The effect of a house on
surrounding property values is a highly subjective determination. Size, age,
appearance, condition, and upkeep must be considered, and in these respects
mobile homes do not differ from other housing.
Given the strong policy arguments for opening more land to mobile
homes,42 it is difficult to justify the persistence of ordinances excluding mobile
homes from zoning districts reserved for single-family dwellings. The persis-
tence of some of these ordinances undoubtedly is attributable to governmental
inertia,43 while the longevity of other ordinances may be the result of the
personal prejudices of local officials. 44 Nevertheless, the majority of these or-
dinances have survived because some measure of public resistance to the mo-
bile home also has survived.4 5
Public attitudes toward the mobile home are in transition. Although the
public accepts mobile homes much more today than it did before,4 6 accept-
ance is by no means unanimous or unequivocal. Because of the shortcomings
of early trailers, communities relegated them to the least desirable areas of the
municipality-often highly visible commercial or industrial areas, or areas
specifically provide for the elimination of fire hazards. Additionally, the mobile home industry
has established its own standards which, in some ways, are more stringent than the federal regula-
tions. See SHEPARD'S, supra note 26, § 1.2. The danger of high winds also has been largely elimi-
nated. The larger and heavier units manufactured today are less vulnerable to high winds than
were their predecessors. The trend towards immobilization, see supra notes 35-36 and accompa-
nying text, has reduced further the threat of wind damage. Both the North Carolina Building
Code and the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance have issued rules regarding the secure
anchoring of mobile homes.
The objections to mobile homes that were based on concern for public health also are no
longer valid. Today, mobile homes are manufactured with all the sanitation facilities of site-built
homes. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
The modem mobile home owner and the site-built home owner are very similar, see spra
note 4 and accompanying text. Thus, there is no longer reason for criticism that mobile home
residents are less respectable than the rest of the population. See, e.g., M. DRURY, supra note 27,
at 71-72; Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 495; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 812-19.
Mobile home owners also were considered objectionable because they failed to pay their way
in taxes. Many states today tax mobile homes as realty. Although North Carolina continues to
tax mobile homes as personalty, personalty and realty are taxed at the same rate. It also has been
argued that "higher-end" mobile homes actually appreciate over the years, as do site-built homes,
thus enhancing local revenues. See B. CALLOWAY, supra note 28, at 37-38.
40. See In re Tradlock, 261 N.C. 120, 122, 134 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1964); 2 A. RATHKOPF & D.
RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-5.
41. M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 71-72.
42. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
43. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 496, 525; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 826.
44. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 525; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 827.
45. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 497; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 809. This residue of
public hostility is the chief cause of the continued existence of zoning ordinances excluding mobile
omes. B. CALLOWAY, supra note 28, at 36-38. See also M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 15; Kuklin,
supra note 15, at 825-26.
46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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along highways.47 These deteriorating units in unattractive locations continue
to influence the public image of the mobile home. Newer and more attractive
units, on the other hand, frequently are located out of public view.48 Perhaps
more fundamentally, the mobile home is resisted because it does not fulfill the
public's image of ideal housing.49 This ideal conflicts with the need for low-
cost housing; until it changes those who cannot afford the ideal home will
continue to suffer. Failure to change public attitudes could result in "an in-
defensible waste of this potentially powerful housing resource."50 Unless the
courts are willing to intervene, the ultimate success of the mobile home indus-
try will depend on the ability of its proponents to convince the public that
highly restrictive zoning ordinances no longer are necessary.5 1
Because such negative attitudes persist a variety of exclusionary zoning
ordinances remain on the books. For example, ordinances establishing mini-
mum floor space52 or minimum lot size 53 requirements indirectly exclude mo-
bile homes. In addition, some zoning ordinances directly restrict the location
of mobile homes. Some ordinances specifically have excluded mobile homes
from the entire community.54 Aside from the constitutional questions they
raise,55 these ordinances force mobile home owners to locate their units
outside the city limits. This unregulated placement of units outside the city's
jurisdiction, however, may hinder a city's expansion.5 6
Rather than excluding mobile homes from the community entirely, most
municipalities exclude them from districts reserved for single-family dwell-
ings.57 Three types of zoning ordinances have been used for this purpose.
First, some ordinances expressly exclude all mobile homes from these dis-
47. See infra notes 57-63, 116, and accompanying text.
48. See Kuklin, supra note 15, at 814.
49. See M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 9.
50. See B. CALLOWAY, supra note 28, at 38. See also Note, Mobile Homes-Some Legal
Questions, 75 W. VA. L. REy. 382, 401 (1973) (growing importance of mobile homes in housing
industry mitigates heavily against their complete prohibition).
51. See Dean, supra note 7, at 10; Kuklin, supra note 15, at 838-42; Note, Zoning Restrictions
Applied to Mobile Homes, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 196, 205 (1971).
52. Even the largest mobile homes are limited in size. Setting minimum floor space require-
ments thus can effectively exclude mobile homes from an area. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D.
RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-23 to -24.
53. Minimum lot size requirements could place the cost of lots beyond the reach of those
persons for whom the mobile home is the only affordable form of housing.
54. Few North Carolina municipalities have adopted this kind of ordinance. See Comment,
Mobile Homes in North Carolina: Residence or Vehicle?, 50 N.C.L. REv. 612, 615 (1972). For the
classic discussion of the total exclusion of mobile homes, see Napierkowski v. Township Comm. of
Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
55. A full discussion of the validity of zoning ordinances that totally exclude mobile homes
from a community is beyond the scope of this note. These ordinances, however, generally have
been held unconstitutional. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-19 to -20.
See also Brough, supra note 6, at 20. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court never has
faced this issue, it has been suggested that the court would follow the weight of authority. See
Comment, supra note 54, at 623. For cases upholding such ordinances, see Moore, The Mobile
Home and the Law, 6 AKRON L. REv. 1, 8 n.39 (1973).
56. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 165. In North Carolina, cities and counties may mitigate
this problem through their power of extraterritorial zoning. See, e.g., City of Raleigh v. Morand,
247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 343 (1958).
57. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-21.
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tricts. 58 Second, some ordinances restrict mobile homes to mobile home
parks.59 Both of these types of ordinances expressly distinguish mobile homes
from single-family dwellings. 60 Third, some reserve a district for "single-fam-
ily dwellings" without expressly restricting mobile homes from the district or
to any other district.61 Mobile homes are then banned from these areas by
construing the word "dwelling" to exclude mobile homes. 62 All three types of
ordinances can be oppressive if there is a shortage of land zoned for mobile
homes or if this land is in an undesirable location.
63
Two issues frequently have arisen regarding zoning ordinances that ex-
clude mobile homes from districts reserved for single-family dwellings. 6 4 The
first involves the interpretation of the ordinance; the second involves its
constitutionality.
Of the three types of ordinances, only the third presents a significant in-
terpretation problem. Ordinances that expressly restrict mobile homes from
residential districts or to mobile home parks usually avoid interpretation
problems by defining the term "mobile home." Such definitions typically are
very broad, classifying as a "mobile home" any unit designed to be trans-
ported on its own wheels regardless of whether it has become immobilized. 65
But the third type of ordinance, which merely limits a district to single-family
dwellings without specifically defining or restricting mobile homes, 66 presents
the question of whether a mobile home is a "dwelling" within the meaning of
the ordinance. 67
58. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.22.
59. The majority of zoned municipalities in North Carolina have adopted this kind of ordi-
nance. See Comment, supra note 54, at 615-16.
60. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-23.
61. See, e.g., Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 592 n.l, 180 N.E.2d 333, 334 n.l
(1962). See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 57.37.
62. See Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962).
63. See Comment, supra note 54, at 624-25; Moore, supra note 55, at 13. In North Carolina
those cities that restrict mobile homes to mobile home parks typically regulate the parks to ensure
some minimum level of quality. See Comment, supra note 54, at 616.
64. Of course, other issues also have arisen, such as whether a zoning ordinance is within the
scope of the enabling legislation, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., CHARLOTrE, N.C., CODE § 23-2(16a) (1970), HIo POINT, N.C., CODE § 22-
9.1(A)(1) (1971).
66. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67. The problem of the proper classification of the mobile home, as dwelling or vehicle,
realty or personalty, has arisen in many contexts. Classification may affect the application of
building, health, and tax codes, the Uniform Commercial Code, statutes of descent and distribu-
tion, provisions of wills, restrictive covenants, insurance contracts, and the statute of frauds. See
Kuklin, supra note 15, at 802-05. The question of whether the "automobile exception" to the
requirement of a search warrant applies to mobile homes also has arisen. See United States v.
Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980).
The courts have held that classification of the mobile home for one purpose does not affect its
classification for other purposes. See Manchester v. Webster, 100 N.H. 809, 128 A.2d 924 (1957)
("Mobile homes" might be "buildings" for tax and insurance purposes without being subject to
local building codes.); Streyle v. Board of Property Assessment, 173 Pa. Super. 324, 98 A.2d 410
(1953) (a "house trailer" might be a "home" for the purposes of police power regulation without
being "realty" for tax purposes).
Although the mobile home industry today rejects the vehicular classification of the mobile
home, see Amicus Curiae Brief, Duggins v. Town of Walnut Cove, 63 N.C. App. 689, 306 S.E.2d
1380 [Vol. 62
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This question has arisen in two situations.68 In the first, the ordinance
limits improvements on realty to single-family dwellings. The mobile home
owner argues that his unit is a "single-family dwelling," while the municipal-
ity argues that the mobile home is not a dwelling and therefore may not be
placed on the property.69 In the second situation the roles of the parties are
reversed. The zoning ordinance requires that all dwellings on the property
conform to certain requirements, such as minimum floor space. The mobile
home cannot satisfy these requirements, so its owner argues that it is not a
"dwelling" and is therefore not subject to the requirements. The municipality
argues that the mobile home is a "dwelling" that fails to comply with the re-
quirements of the ordinance, and thus cannot be located on the property.70
Courts agree that a mobile home is not a dwelling as long as it remains
inobile.71 Most of the litigation has been concerned with whether a mobile
home becomes a dwelling when it becomes permanently immobilized, that is,
when its wheels and tongue are removed and it is placed on a permanent foun-
dation. On this question the courts are divided. 72 A slight majority have held
that when its wheel and tongue are removed and it is placed on a permanent
foundation a mobile home becomes a dwelling and may not be excluded from
a district reserved for single-family dwellings. 73 This view is founded on the
presumption that the distinguishing characteristic of a mobile home is its mo-
bility, and when this characteristic is removed there is no reason to distinguish
between site-built homes and mobile homes per se. Concerns over property
values and architectural harmony can be satisfied by specific ordinances out-
lining criteria such as minimum floor space and architectural standards.
Given the increasing similarity between mobile and site-built homes, this posi-
tion is reasonable. A growing number of states have adopted the majority
186 (1983), at 2-3, one writer has argued that the success of the mobile home has been linked to its
classification as a vehicle. See M. DRURY, supra note 27, at 123. Some writers have suggested
that rather than trying to pigeonhole the mobile home into some inappropriate existing classifica-
tion, it should be recognized as sui generis. See Carter, Problems in the Regulation and Taxation of
Mobile Homes, 48 IowA L. REv. 16, 57 (1962). One court anticipated this advice. See
Napierkowski v. Town Comm. of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 485, 150 A.2d 481, 485 (1959).
68. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 499-501; Carter, supra note 67, at 36.
69. See, e.g., Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962); Sioux
Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70 N.W.2d 62 (1955).
70. County v. Stanfill, 7 Ill. App. 2d 52, 129 N.E.2d 46 (1955) (minimum lot-size require-
ment); Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga. App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951) (minimum floor-space
requirements).
71. See B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 66.
72. P. ROHAN, ZONING & LAND USE CONTROLS 390 (1983). Two distinct questions are
presented by the immobilization of the mobile home: (1) Is an immobilized mobile home still a
mobile home? and (2) If not, is it a dwelling? A court could find that when placed upon a perma-
nent foundation a mobile home ceases to be a mobile home but does not become a dwelling.
Courts, however, have not made this distinction. Evidently, it is assumed that if an immobilized
mobile home is no longer a mobile home it must be a dwelling.
73. See, e.g., Reed v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 31 Pa. Commw. 605, 377 A.2d 1020 (1977);
Mosin v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Review, 162 R.I. 457, 232 A.2d 393 (1967); Lescault v. Zoning Bd.
of Review, 91 R.I. 1277, 162 A.2d 809 (1960); In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958).
Among the cases holding that mobile homes are dwellings are Kimsey v. City of Rome, 84 Ga.
App. 671, 67 S.E.2d 206 (1951) and Town of Huntington v. Transon, 43 Misc. 2d 912, 252
N.Y.S.2d 576 (1964).
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view by legislation.74
A minority of the courts have determined that placement of a mobile
home on a permanent foundation does not transform it into a dwelling. 75 The
minority view has been criticized for denying immobilized mobile homes the
status of single-family dwellings merely because of their past mobility.76 The
minority view, however, appears to be tacitly based on an additional principle:
a unit manufactured in a factory and designed to move on its own wheels must
differ from conventional housing in many ways that survive immobilization.
Because of the important changes in the design and construction of the mobile
home, this reasoning no longer is valid. The original mobility of the mobile
home is the last remaining distinction between mobile and conventional
housing.77
No reported North Carolina case has considered whether an immobilized
mobile home is a dwelling. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however,
has twice considered whether an immobilized mobile home is still a mobile
home. In City of Asheboro v. Auman7 s the court considered an ordinance re-
stricting mobile homes to mobile home parks79 and concluded that a unit
stripped of its wheels and tongue and placed upon a permanent foundation
remained a "mobile home."80 In the 1983 case of Barber v. Dixon,81 the court
construed a restrictive covenant82 providing that: "No structure of a tempo-
rary character (including house trailers) shall be used upon any lot at any
time."'8 3 The court could have questioned whether a modem mobile home is a
"house trailer." Instead, the court assumed that the unit in question was a
74. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 712.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); S.D. New Laws, H.B.
1127 p. 105; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-3-3 (Supp. 1983).
75. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Louviere, 52 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 1951); Town of
Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962); Town of Marblehead v. Gilbert, 334
Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956). See also Comment, supra note 54, at 619; 2 R. ANDERSON,
supra note 9, § 14.05.
76. 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-8 to -9.
77. Seethe discussion of design and construction changes, supra notes 30-36 and accompany-
ing text, and the discussion of the invalidity of original objections to mobile homes, supra note 39
and accompanying text. The presumption of other distinctions between mobile and conventional
housing based upon the original mobility of the mobile home is even more tenuous because of the
growing tendency of the conventional housing industry to use prefabricated materials. Moreover,
modular units, see 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 19-8 to -9, usually are
classified as dwellings because they were not designed for mobility, although these units also are
produced in factories.
78. 26 N.C. App. 87, 214 S.E.2d 621, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 239, 217 S.E.2d 663 (1975).
79. ASHEBORO, N.C., CODE § 609-12 (1972).
80. Auman, 26 N.C. App. at 88, 214 S.E.2d at 621.
81. 62 N.C. App. 455, 302 S.E.2d 915, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 732 (1983).
82. Most courts construe zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants according to the same
principles, and decisions construing one often are cited in cases construing the other. See Bartke
& Gage, supra note 6, at 515 & n. 113. The Supreme Court of Maine, however, has treated restric-
tive covenants more liberally than zoning ordinances. For cases construing the word "dwelling"
with regard to mobile homes as used in restrictive covenants, see Carter v. Conroy, 25 Ariz. App.
434, 544 P.2d 258 (1976); Mitchell v. Killins, 408 So. 2d 969 (La. Ct. App. 1981); North Cherokee
Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976); Wade v. Anderson,
602 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1977).
83. Barber, 62 N.C. App. at 456, 302 S.E.2d at 916.
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"house trailer" 84 and considered the critical question to be whether a "house
trailer" remains a "house trailer" after it is immobilized. Relying on its deci-
sion inAuman, the court concluded that an immobilized double-wide unit was
still a "trailer and temporary structure"85 because the two sections had been
transported to the site "by wheels, tongues and axles that were bolted on at the
place of manufacture and removed about two days after the units were located
on the lot."'86 These decisions suggest that under North Carolina law a unit
designed to be mobile is forever a mobile home, future immobilization
notwithstanding. The two definitions of the term "mobile home" appearing in
the North Carolina statutes also employ this classification.87
Although the question of whether an immobilized mobile home is still a
mobile home logically is distinct from the question of whether an immobilized
mobile home is a dwelling, courts generally have considered the first question
to be determinative of the second.88 Consequently, if faced with the precise
issue, a North Carolina court probably would adopt the minority view that an
immobilized mobile home is not a dwelling.8 9 Nevertheless, the distinction
between all mobile homes and all site-built homes on the basis of the original
mobility of the mobile home is tenuous and probably will spawn continued
litigation. 90
As statutory terms become defined more specifically through legislation
and litigation, complainants often will need to rely on constitutional chal-
lenges. Zoning ordinances that exclude mobile homes from districts reserved
for single-family dwellings have been attacked as violating the requirements of
substantive due process by going beyond the permissible bounds of the State's
police power.91
The tenth amendment reserves the police power to the states.92 The po-
lice power is incapable of strict definition or limitation93 but was described by
Blackstone as:
84. Ten years earlier, in Van Poole v. Messer, 19 N.C. App. 70, 198 S.E.2d 106 (1973), the
court of appeals ruled that a mobile home was a "trailer" and therefore was excluded from a lot
by a restrictive covenant prohibiting "trailers."
85. Barber, 62 N.C. App. at 459, 302 S.E.2d at 917.
86. Id. at 458, 302 S.E.2d at 917.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-143.9(6), 145(7) (1983).
88. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
89. The North Carolina Attorney General has determined, however, that for the purposes of
relocation assistance a mobile home is a dwelling. See 40 N.C. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 762,
763 (Sept. 2, 1969). Furthermore, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.5(a) (1983) provides that a husband and
wife occupying a mobile home are to be treated as tenants by the entirety. It is not clear, however,
whether the premise of this statute is that mobile homes are realty or whether they are only to be
treated as if they were in this situation.
90. Bartke & Gage, supra note 6, at 498, 500, 504.
91. See, e.g., Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981); City of
Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982).
92. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1908); Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E.
638 (1933). The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
93. Pearsall v. Great N. R.R., 161 U.S. 646 (1895); Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E.
638 (1933).
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the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the
individuals of the state, like the members of a well-governed family,
are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety,
good neighborhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industri-
ous, and inoffensive in their respective stations.94
The police power may be exercised to require all citizens to yield property
interests, for the public good, without compensation. 95
The political subdivisions of the states have no inherent authority to exer-
cise the police power.96 The states may, however, delegate to units of local
government so much of the police power as they choose through "enabling
legislation." 97 The power of municipalities to enact zoning ordinances has
long been recognized as a proper exercise of the delegated police power.98 In
North Carolina, cities and counties have been granted general authority to
exercise the police power9 9 and specific authority to enact zoning
ordinances. 100
The police power may restrain enjoyment of private property to further
the public good, yet exercise of the police power must be limited to protect
individual rights. The fourteenth amendment states that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."' 1 1 In
addition to its procedural mandate,102 this due process clause has been inter-
preted as placing substantive limitations on government action.103 Legislative
measures may be void as a violation of substantive due process if they are
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.1°4
The courts have developed a three-part test to determine whether an exer-
cise of the police power survives a substantive due process challenge.10 5 First,
the statute or ordinance must serve some legitimate purpose of the police
power.'06 The purposes of the police power are defined broadly to include the
promotion and protection of the public health, safety, morals, and general wel-
94. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162. Blackstone used the phrase "public power,"
but it is clear that the two labels are intended to refer to the same authority.
95. See Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057,
1058 (1980).
96. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 2, at 190.
97. 1 T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 1.02 (rev. 2d ed. 1983);
Note, Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 121, 126-27 (1961).
98. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121(a) (1983) (counties); id. § 160A-174(a) (1982) (cities).
100. Id § 153A-340 to -348 (1983) (counties); Id § 160A-381 to -392 (1982) (cities).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
102. "Taken literally the term dueprocess relates to the mode of proceeding that must be
pursued by governmental agencies. Due process of law, in this sense, denotesproperprocedure,
and it was the meaning primarily intended by the men who drafted the Bill of Rights." B.
SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 (1972).
103. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
104. See, e.g., Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 154 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir. 1946).
105. See Stoebuck, supra note 95, at 1058.
106. See, e.g., Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Bantor, 273 U.S. 418 (1927);
State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
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fare.' 07 Second, assuming a valid purpose, the means adopted by the legisla-
ture must be rationally related to the attainment of the objective.108 If there is
any reasonable likelihood that the ordinance will tend to accomplish its objec-
tive, it will satisfy this second requirement. 10 9 Finally, assuming a valid pur-
pose and a means rationally related to achieving that purpose, the means itself
must still be reasonable; 110 the courts may strike down unduly oppressive leg-
islation. 1'" This reasonableness requirement involves a balancing of public
gain against private loss."12 Courts are reluctant to question the legislature's
exercise of the police power, 113 but if the public gain is slight and the private
burden great, courts may find a violation of substantive due process. 114
The federal courts never have ruled on whether zoning ordinances that
exclude mobile homes from residential districts violate substantive due pro-
cess. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has not faced this issue, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals has considered the question twice.
In Currituck County v. Willey" 5 the court of appeals upheld as constitu-
tional an ordinance excluding all mobile homes that did not meet certain di-
mensional requirements." 16 The court cited a number of cases for the rule that
an ordinance enjoys a strong presumption of validity and that " 'the burden is
upon the complaining party to show its invalidity or inapplicability.' ""7 In
affirming a judgment for the county the court concluded "that defendant has
not met her burden."'"18
The question was reconsidered by the court of appeals in Duggins v. Town
of Walnut Cove" 9 in 1983. Duggins owned a lot in a district zoned by defend-
107. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
108. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
109. See, e.g., 1 T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, supra note 97, § 2.10.
110. See B. HODES & G. ROBERSON supra note 2, at 204-217.
111. See, e.g., 1 T. MATTHEWS & B. MATTHEWS, supra note 97, § 1.09; Note, supra note 51, at
197 n.6.
112. See, e.g., Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 A. 595, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 506 (1936);
Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J. 145, 198 A. 225 (1938).
113. See Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("We do not sit as a super-
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses
offends the public welfare."). The party questioning an ordinance has the difficult burden of
proving that it fails to satisfy one of the requirements of due process. See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 461 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally Flippen, supra note 27, at 18 &
n.21; SHEPARD'S, supra note 26, § 10.5; Carter, supra note 67, at 39-40.
114. Note, supra note 50, at 197 n.10. The Supreme Court's extreme deference to the legisla-
ture in the area of substantive due process is evidenced by: Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980)
(upholding open space zoning); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(upholding historic landmark preservation). In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494(1977) substantive due process was labelled a "treacherous field."
115. 46 N.C. App. 835, 266 S.E.2d 52 (1980).
116. The ordinance provided: "(a) Permitted uses of buildings, structures and land: Dwellings,
one family detached including modular and double-wide mobile homes with minimum dimen-
sions of 24' x 60', but no other mobile homes." Id at 835, 266 S.E.2d at 52.
117. Wlley, 46 N.C. App. at 836, 266 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 18,
20, 171 S.E.2d 115 (1969)).
118. Id
119. 63 N.C. App. 684, 306 S.E.2d 186 (1983), appeal filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3760 (N.C. Mar. 3,
1984).
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ant for residential use exclusive of mobile homes.120 Under the ordinance, all
mobile homes were excluded regardless of their size, appearance, or mobility,
while all site-built homes were permitted. 12 ' Plaintiff contended that this ordi-
nance violated substantive due process because it bore no rational relationship
to any legitimate objective of police power regulation.'2 2 Plaintiff admitted
that the ordinance was presumed constitutional, but argued that he could pres-
ent evidence to overcome this presumption.' 2 3 At the trial level, defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted.
The court of appeals affirmed, 124 mentioning its decision in Willey, but
choosing to consider the question anew.12 5 The court applied the three-part
due process analysis, beginning its discussion by pointing out that the ordi-
nance was entitled to a strong presumption of validity: "If any state of facts
can be conceived that will sustain the zoning ordinance, the existence of that
state of facts must be assumed.'126 The first prong of the due process test
requires that the zoning ordinance be enacted to promote the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare. Plaintiff did not allege that the ordinance had not
been enacted for such a purpose, and defendant did not allege any particular
purpose for which it had been enacted. Although the point thus was not in
issue, the court reasonably assumed that the ordinance had been enacted to
protect the value of the property in the zoned area. 127 Protection of property
values has long been considered a valid purpose for police power regula-
120. Defendant's ordinance created three classes of single-family residences: mobile homes,
modular homes, and site-built homes. _d at 685-86, 306 S.E.2d at 187.
121. Id. at 686, 306 S.E.2d at 187.
122. Record at 7-8 (quoting plaintiff's complaint § 21).
123. Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 11.
124. Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 689, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
125. The court stated in Willey: "We hold that mobile homes are sufficiently different from
other types of housing so that there is a rational basis for placing different requirements upon
them as was done by Currituck County." Willey, 46 N.C. App. at 836, 266 S.E.2d at 53. Defend-
ant in Duggins relied heavily on this "holding," contending that it established a rule of law bind-
ing on the court.
Thus, the Court of Appeals has unequivocally rejected Appellant's contention that ordi-
nances such as Walnut Cove's violate any constitutional provisions.. . . Appellant's
attempts to distinguish between the Willey holding and the facts of this case ignore the
broad unambiguous language used there indicating that the issue of the rationality of
mobile home zoning ordinances has already been conclusively determined.. . . In con-
clusion, defendants respectfully assert that previously issued opinions of the appellate
court of North Carolina conclusively established that zoning ordinances like Walnut
Cove's are constitutional.
Record, Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 10-12.
Plaintiff in Duggins labelled the "holding" of the Wiley court obiter dictum, asserting that the
case actually had been decided on the grounds that defendant had failed to overcome the ordi-
nance's presumption of validity. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 22, Duggins. Plaintiff argued that
whether a municipality can distinguish validly between mobile and site-built homes is a question
of fact that must be determined on the basis of the complainant's evidence in each case. Id. at 23.
The Duggins court's decision not to rely on Wiley but to consider the matter anew suggests that
the court accepted plaintiff's view of the "holding" in that case.
126. Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 688, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
127. "The protection of property values in the zoned area is a legitimate governmental objec-
tive. We believe that the method of construction of homes [the basis of defendant's distinction
between mobile and site-built homes] may be determined by a city governing board as affecting
the price of homes." Id at 688-89, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
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tion, t 28 and traditionally has been the primary reason given for excluding mo-
bile homes from residential districts. 129
The second prong of the due process analysis requires that the means
adopted by the ordinance be rationally related to the objective of the regula-
tion. Plaintiff in Duggins argued that defendant's ordinance lacked a rational
relation to any purpose within the police power. 130
Early zoning ordinances enacted to exclude mobile homes from residen-
tial districts were based on legitimate concerns about the dangers actually
posed by trailers unsuited for permanent occupancy. 13t These dangers,
unique to mobile homes, could be eliminated best by excluding all mobile
homes from residential districts. These early ordinances were substantially re-
lated to the ends for which they were enacted. Plaintiff in Duggins argued that
if he could show that mobile homes no longer present these problems, an ordi-
nance excluding mobile homes would not only be unnecessary, but would bear
no rational relation to the purpose of eliminating those problems. 132
Because mobile homes today probably pose no danger to public health,
safety, or morals, an ordinance excluding mobile homes is not likely to have
any rational relation to these concerns. 133 But whether such an ordinance
bears a rational relation to the protection of property values is not as clear. 134
Some mobile homes, like some site-built homes, can reduce the value of sur-
rounding propery. Plaintiff in Duggins contended that a zoning ordinance ex-
cluding all mobile homes while permitting all site-built homes, without regard
to which homes actually would lower property values, is not rationally related
to protection of property values. 135 The court correctly rejected this argu-
ment. 136 If some units of a particular class are likely to reduce property val-
ues, the exclusion of the entire class certainly will protect property values, and
it is irrelevant that the ordinance does not also regulate another class that af-
fects property values. Thus, ordinances such as that passed by the town of
Walnut Cove satisfy the requirements of the second prong of the substantive
due process analysis.
Finally, the due process analysis requires the ordinance to be reasonable.
In determining reasonableness, the courts must balance public gain against
private loss. If the public gain is insignificant and the private burden severe
128. Protection of property values is necessary to the general welfare. This is recognized by
North Carolina statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-383 (1982) lists protection of property values as
a valid purpose of zoning. This statute must be considered as consistent with id. § 160A-381,
which requires that zoning ordinances be enacted only for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare.
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
130. See Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12-19.
131. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
132. See Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12-19.
133. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 40-41, 128 and accompanying text.
135. Record, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 12.
136. "The prohibition of such buildings [mobile homes] is rationally related to the protection
of the value of other homes in the area." Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 689, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
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the ordinance will be considered unreasonable.' 37 Another issue is whether
the restriction is necessary to secure the desired end; if a significantly less re-
strictive ordinance would achieve the same result, the ordinance may be
unreasonable.' 38
The court in Duggins granted defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to meet his burden of
proof and overcome the ordinance's presumption of constitutionality. Instead,
the court went beyond recognizing that the ordinance was presumed constitu-
tional to a conclusion that the reasonableness of the ordinance was beyond the
scope of judicial review. The court stated that it "cannot interfere with this
legislative decision" and that it did "not believe [it] should make this factual
determination. This is a matter for the governing board of Walnut Cove."' 13 9
The court's reluctance to hear plaintiff's evidence is unfortunate because the
reasonableness of this ordinance is highly questionable. The public benefit
secured by the ordinance was slight. Although the ordinance protected against
mobile homes reducing the value of nearby properties, it did not guard against
a similar danger posed by site-built housing. An ordinance requiring that any
improvements to the realty in the restricted area not lower property values
would eliminate this danger without excluding mobile homes per se. Even
granting that the ordinance achieved a significant public gain, it imposed a
considerable hardship on plaintiff and others in his class. In its specific appli-
cation the ordinance had the effect of denying to plaintiff the use of his prop-
erty, as he could not afford any other type of housing. In its general
application the ordinance required all those who could not afford traditional
housing to live in mobile home parks. Given the public policy favoring the
increased use of the mobile home' 40 and the persistence of zoning ordinances
defeating that policy, the North Carolina courts should be more willing to
scrutinize this type of local regulation. 14'
WILLIAM WINSLETT NELSON
137. See supra note 112-114 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
139. Duggins, 63 N.C. App. at 689, 306 S.E.2d at 189.
140. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
141. See Justice Hall's classic dissent in Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester, 37 N.J.
232, 259, 181 A.2d 129, 143 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). "[O]ur
courts have in recent years made it virtually impossible for municipal zoning regulations to be
successfully attacked. Judicial scrutiny has become too superficial and one-sided." Id. at 259, 181
A.2d at 143 (Hall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Hall "[t]he judicial branch does not meet
its full responsibility when, as here, its concept of review gives unquestioning deference to the
views of local officials." Id. at 261, 181 A.2d at 145 (Hall, J., dissenting). See also Williams,
Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 317 (1955):
While controversy has often raged about judicial action in other areas, it has always been
recognized that it is an essential part of the judicial function to watch over parochial and
exclusionist attitudes and policies of local governments, and to see to it that these do not
run counter to the national policy and the general welfare.
Id. at 318.
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